The Violence in Medellin: A Talk With Medellin's Ombudsman

It's taken me a while to get around writing this, but I really thought this was worthwhile to put down on [virtual] paper. Back in November Giovanni and I met with the Ombudsman of Medellin. We met specifically to talk about the increasing violence in Medellin and his thoughts on it. Jairo Herran Vargas openly welcomed us into his office and with our first interview question gave us a general 20-minute analysis and summary of the violence in Medellin, (check out the video in Spanish on Gio's blog). Normally I don't like to point out Colombia's faults, but I think it is important for whoever's reading this to gain a little more insight into the situation.

When people think "Colombia" they think "drugs" and "violence." When they think Medellin they add Pablo Escobar in the mix. These keywords are a bag of worms that do little to help Colombia's reputation. Colombia has come a long way since Escobar's days, though. Many attribute current President Alvaro Uribe to the country's improvements by putting into action some much needed reforms and helping to smooth the mess out. In 2003, after decades of violence throughout Colombia with paramilitaries mandating, a pact was signed between the government and paramilitary leaders across the nation. The process of demobilization ensued. The agreement basically stated that if the paramilitaries turned in their arms, they would not be punished, and they would be allowed to join the normal ranks of society. Due to this agreement along with other factors including culture, family, and weariness, Colombia saw a decrease in violence over the next few years.

There are mixed views regarding the effectiveness of these agreements, with some saying that it was just a way of legalizing the paramilitary groups. The process of demobilization consisted of paramilitary group members turning in their weapons and uniforms to be given a ID card stating they were once part of an illegal group but had demobilized. However, many paramilitary leaders merely found teenagers on the street to pretend they were part of the group to comply with the pact and get the ID. This allowed them to continue with their paramilitary activities, "legally." Those that did legitimately hand over their paramilitary paraphernalia were given a psychological evaluation and some schooling and were sent on their merry way back to the same neighborhoods that they had just come from. This is one thing that Ombudsman Vargas strongly commented on. He says, "There was no quarantine. There needed to be a method to reincorporate them into the community."

In those years, there were a lot of police on the streets to ensure the agreement was carried out. A wave of fear was passed through communities as these forces armed with heavy duty gear, helmets, and weapons instilled pressure and authority. This method, though effective in many neighborhoods, was not necessarily the right one for every city. The president as the head of the police gave a general order as he saw fit for the entire country. The mayors then had to enforce these orders, regardless of their appropriateness in their cities, said Vargas. The measures were too repressive in Medellin. We needed more involvement among the whole community and more opportunities for these people, he criticizes.

On May 13, 2008 paramilitary leaders were extradited to the United States to stand trial upon drug trafficking-related charges, violating part of the terms of the pact between the Colombian government and the paramilitary leaders. Vargas sees this as the downfall of the process of demobilization and the main reason for the increase in violence. Not only because the government didn't meet the terms of the agreement, but because when these leaders were extradited, a chain of command was broken.

Today, Vargas attributes the increasing number of murders to "combos," illegal armed groups. Most homicides occur between or among the groups, (which is why you haven't heard any crazy stories from me nor have I witnessed first-hand anything like what I saw in the CNN video released back in October). According to local NGOs, there are anywhere between 120 to 300 combos. However Vargas claims the number of "delinquent groups" to be more like 150-180. This type of illegal armed group is made up of teenagers, young adults, and demobilized ex-paramilitaries. It is hard for kids because they really have no other alternative. They see other older group members with flashy motorcycles, clothes, money, and girls and see this as their only option. Unfortunately for most, it is. That is why it is impossible to dismantle these groups-there are always kids at the ready if one backs out.

However Vargas proposes some solutions:

1. First, he says, we need to create an interdisciplinary unit to analyze the crime and murder rates in order to give the government a proper detailed summary of the situation. These people will investigate in depth the groups, communities, stores, schools, the people in control, and police efforts to give an informed report.

2. A more focused strategy. Vargas states that after studies have been released, a more specialized and strategic plan needs to be developed. This includes a social plan in which private as well as public businesses participate and by doing so support people who have been displaced due to the violence. So far, efforts such as curfews and more police on the streets have not made much of a difference. The government simply wants results, therefore when it sees the numbers lower it is automatically contributed to the new laws. However eventually the frustration with these new laws turns into rebellion and retaliation and they do not last.

3. Offer alternatives to children. A social program should be formed to get kids involved in their community, to offer them other opportunities, and another perspective outside of their violent community. The school day is made up of two sessions, morning and afternoon, with children only going to school for five hours. Most parents lock them up in the house outside of school hours to keep them away from the danger, making them even more curious about the outside world. Many libraries and community centers have been created to offer these children something to do but they do not reach all kids.

Whatever the solution, it needs to be a national effort. The plan might not be the same for each city or town, but everyone needs to present a united front to combat the violence overtaking their nation. I strongly believe that little things such as voting could really make a difference. In a nation of 44 million, only about 15 million vote. I've talked to many Colombians who are just not interested in politics and give the usual excuse that their vote won't make a difference. But if Colombians actively got involved in politics, in their nation's well-being, it would be a good personal step in the right direction. Colombia has started to gain international recognition through trade agreements and by not giving into to its radical neighbors Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Recently, it even made the New York Time's "31 Places to Visit in 2010" list. In the years to come I really see Colombia as taking off. It has all the right ingredients for a tourist destination-a beautiful mix of climates and landscapes including beaches, jungles, and thriving metropolitans; delicious food; friendly and welcoming people; a profound dedication to the arts; and so much more! It just has to work out some...kinks you could say.